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The focus of this paper is Ockham’s stance on the question of 
divine concurrence—the question whether God is causally active 
in the causal happenings of the created world, and if so, what 
God’s causal activity amounts to and what place that leaves for 
created causes. After discussing some preliminaries, I turn to 
presenting what I take to be Ockham’s account. As I show, 
Ockham, at least in this issue, is rather conservative: he agrees 
with the majority of medieval thinkers (including Aquinas, 
Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and others) that both God and cre-
ated agents are causally active in the causal happenings of the 
world. Then I turn to some texts that may suggest otherwise; I 
argue that reading Ockham as either an occasionalist or a mere 
conservationist based on these texts originates from a misunder-
standing of his main concern. I conclude with raising and 
briefly addressing some systematic worries regarding Ockham’s 
account of concurrence. 
 
The interpretation of Ockham’s thoughts on causation underwent the kind of change during the twentieth century that has become 
almost customary for fourteenth-century thinkers. The historiography, 
at least in outline, has been something like this: people had, for a long 
time, read Ockham as a Humean, some defending its cogency; then it 
was shown that Ockham had held neither the metaphysical thesis that 
causation is mere correlation, nor even the weaker epistemological one 
that we cannot have knowledge or certainty of the principle of causal-
ity.1 With this, the issue was mostly settled. One might wonder, nev-
ertheless, whether the question of Humeanism was wrongly posed to 
start with. Ockham was a medieval theologian, and with all of his con-
temporaries, held that at least God is efficiently causally active by cre-
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       1. Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (South Bend, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1987), chapter 18; and eadem, “Was Ockham a Humean about 
Efficient Causality?,” Franciscan Studies 39 (1979): 5–48. She also provides 
numerous examples for Ockham’s Humean interpretation. 
ating (and sustaining) the universe. Thus, the crucial question to be 
posed for Ockham seems to be not so much a question of Humeanism 
but rather a question about the role of divine causation in the created 
realm—the question of divine concurrence.  
      To put it simply, the question of divine concurrence concerns 
whether God is causally active in the causal happenings of the world, 
and if so, what his causal activity amounts to.2 There is a whole spec-
trum of different views that medieval thinkers endorsed regarding this 
subject, clustering around three main positions.3 First, occasionalists 
held that it is only God who is causally active in what we see as the 
causal happenings of the world. Second, mere conservationists held 
that God only keeps the world in existence but otherwise is not in any 
way involved in its causal happenings. Third, concurrentists (propo-
nents of the majority view) thought that both God and created causes 
are causally active in producing effects.4 
      The focus of this paper is Ockham’s stance on this question. After 
discussing some preliminaries, I will turn to presenting what I take to 
be Ockham’s account. As I show, Ockham, at least in this issue, is 
rather conservative: he agrees with the majority of medieval thinkers 
(including Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and others) that 
both God and created agents are causally active in the causal happen-
ings of the world. Then I turn to some texts that may suggest other-
wise; I will argue that reading Ockham as either an occasionalist or a 
mere conservationist based on these texts originates from a misunder-
standing of his main concern. I will conclude with raising and briefly 
addressing some systematic worries regarding Ockham’s account of 
concurrence.   
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       2. All this should be understood in a, broadly speaking, Aristotelian frame-
work; more about that below. By “cause,” unless otherwise noted, I always mean 
an efficient cause in the Aristotelian sense. Although there were other senses of 
“cause” in which medieval thinkers thought God was a cause of the created world, 
they fall outside the scope of the present issue. 
       3. These positions were not equally represented; most medieval thinkers, in 
fact, were somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. 
       4. For a general overview of these positions, see, e.g., Alfred J. Freddoso, 
“God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is not 
Enough,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 553–585. I will follow the usual way 
of talking about “secondary causes” in the sense of created causes, and at times I 
will also use the expression “secondary effect” to denote the effect of a secondary 
cause. 
OCKHAM ON CONCURRENCE: THE SHORT STORY 
 
      Since the question of divine concurrence concerns whether God 
and created things are causes, it will be useful to look first at Ockham’s 
understanding of efficient causes in general. Ockham, like most of his 
Aristotelian contemporaries, understood causation to be a relation, 
involving substances acting on other substances. For his theory of 
divine concurrence we need not go into the metaphysical details of this 
generally Aristotelian framework, but it should be kept in mind that 
when we talk about an “effect,” we usually mean an accident produced 
in a subject (such as the accident of health produced in a patient), and 
that Ockham, being a reductivist about most of Aristotle’s categories, 
thinks that the relation of causality itself can be reduced to the agent, 
the patient, and the effect.5 
      Ockham gives slightly different formulations of what he means by 
the term causa in different places, and the number of these definitions 
and the significance of the differences between them remain unclear. 
Nevertheless, this one from the Ordinatio seems to capture, at least 
generally, the gist of most of his similar definitions: a cause is “that 
which, when it is posited while others are destroyed, the effect follows; 
or that which, when it is not posited while whatever else is posited, the 
effect does not follow.”6 Based on this and similar passages, it seems 
that for Ockham, the following gives at least an approximation of what 
we regard as efficient causes: 
 
EC: c is an efficient cause of e just in case: if c is posited then e is 
(or can be) posited without any further entities, while if c is not 
posited then e is not (or cannot be) posited either. 
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       5. For some details of his view, see Susan Brower-Toland, “Causation and 
Mental Content: Against the Externalist Reading of Ockham,” in The Language of 
Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Claude Panaccio, ed. 
Magali Roques and Jenny Pelletier (Springer, 2017), 55–80; and Robert Aurelien, 
“L’explication causale selon Guillaume d’Ockham,” Quaestio 2 (2002): 241–265. 
See also Adams, William Ockham, chapter 19. 
        6. Guillelmi de Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 1, q. 3 (hereafter Ord.): quod ipso 
posito, alio destructo, sequitur ille effectus, vel quod ipso non posito, quocumque alio 
posito, non sequitur effectus. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Theologica (hereafter OTh), 
ed. Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1967), I, 416. See 
also the almost verbatim identical definition in the Expositio Physicorum (hereafter Exp. 
Phys.) VII, c. 3, 4: illud est causa alicuius rei, quo non posito omni alio posito, res illa 
non est, et quo posito, res est. Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Philosophica (hereafter 
OPh), ed. Gedeon Gál (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 1985), V, 
629–630. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Latin are mine. 
Thus, for instance, if we say that fire is the efficient cause of heat, then 
according to Ockham, what we mean is that if fire is present, then we 
need nothing else to explain the presence of heat; or, if fire is not pres-
ent, we will not find heat either.7 
      Ockham’s definition might seem rather minimalistic or even triv-
ial, but in some sense it will turn out to be both too broad and too 
narrow. It is too broad since there are things that are not properly 
speaking causally related, but nevertheless fulfill EC; and it is too 
narrow for a general notion of efficient causality because it only picks 
out efficient causes that are total, immediate causes of their effects. To 
see this, and to better understand Ockham’s discussion of divine con-
currence, the following distinctions might be helpful. 
      First, consider the distinction between mediate and immediate 
causes. This was a standard distinction in medieval discussions of con-
currence, even though different thinkers often understood it slightly 
differently. As Ockham notes in the Physics commentary, on his under-
standing, only immediate causes are causes properly speaking, while 
mere mediate causes are causes only somewhat improperly so.8 This is 
because a mediate cause does not fulfill EC: it could happen that an 
effect exists while its mediate cause does not. In fact, this is the case in 
every per accidens ordered causal series. For instance, although 
Adam—according to the story of Genesis—is the first member of the 
causal series that generated me, I can continue on living even if Adam 
is not around any longer.9 Thus, as Ockham notes, “every cause, prop-
erly speaking, is an immediate cause.”10 
      It was also customary to distinguish between various senses of 
“immediacy”; between what we may call “immediacy of supposit” and 
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        7. The parenthetical parts of EC mark the usual distinction between cause 
in potency and cause in act; this, however, will not play an important role in the 
present issue. 
        8. Exp. Phys. VII, c. 3, 3: Causa autem uno modo accipitur pro causa imme-
diata . . . aliter accipitur . . . magis improprie pro illo quod est tantum causa causae 
(OPh V, 628). 
        9. Ockham notoriously criticizes the notion of essential order between 
causes, at least as Scotus had understood it; perhaps this is the reason why he does 
not make the distinction in those terms. According to some commentators, he 
simply misunderstands Scotus’s notion of essential order (see, e.g., Adams, 
William Ockham, 772–780; and Rega Wood, “Ockham on Essentially-Ordered 
Causes: Logic Misapplied,” in Die Gegenwart Ockhams, ed. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl 
and Rolf Schönberger (Weinheim: VCH, Acta humaniora, 1990), 25–50). 
       10. Ord. I, d. 45, q. un: Omnis causa proprie dicta est causa immediata (OTh 
IV, 665). 
“immediacy of power.” To illustrate it with a common example, when 
a bailiff acts on behalf of the king, the king is an immediate cause of 
the bailiff’s deeds with the immediacy of power (the bailiff cannot do 
anything but by the king). On the other hand, the bailiff is an imme-
diate cause with the immediacy of supposit, since he is the one who is 
the most proximate to his action.11 While Ockham does not make the 
distinction explicitly, it will prove to be helpful in understanding his 
take on divine concurrence. 
      Second, consider the distinction between total and partial causes. 
It should be noted that the only kind of causes that fulfill definition EC 
above are total causes, and indeed, the definition of “total cause” that 
Ockham gives is almost verbatim the same as definition EC.12 We 
know that it is the fire that is producing heat in a room by removing 
everything else from the room but the fire, and observing that the heat 
still remains. And of course, with partial causes this is not so: if c1 and 
c2 are partial causes of e, then if c1 is posited without c2 then e will not 
come about. 
      There is more to be said about Ockham’s precise understanding of 
efficient causes; I will return to some further intricacies of the defini-
tion below. These distinctions are enough now to formulate the ques-
tion of divine concurrence more precisely: is God an immediate cause 
of every effect in the created world? If so, are God and the secondary 
cause both total causes, or are they partial causes of one and the same 
effect? Are created causes causes of their effects at all? 
      Ockham’s answer, in short, is that both God and created agents 
are immediate causes of secondary effects, and that we can imagine 
how this works by the help of an analogy: 
 
Imagine that a very strong man can carry ten pounds of weight 
on his own, and no one can carry that much without him. Then 
if one of the weak men were to carry that ten pounds with that 
strong one, nevertheless the strong would still be said to carry it 
immediately just as the weak one. And this does not make the 
weak one superfluous, if the strong one does not want to carry 
the ten pounds on his own.13 
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       11. For the example, see Giles of Rome, Questiones de ente et essentia, q. 4. 
For a contemporary analysis, see Gloria Frost, “Peter Olivi’s Rejection of God’s 
Concurrence with Created Causes,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 
22(4) (2014 October): 655–679, especially 662–663. 
       12. E.g., Reportatio (hereafter Rep.) II, q. 3–4 (OTh V, 63). 
       13. Rep. II, q. 3–4: Exemplum rude ad hoc: ponatur quod unus homo for-
tissimus possit portare decem per se, et nullus alius posset portare sine eo. Tunc si  
It is not entirely clear how much one should read into this exemplum 
crude (as Ockham himself calls it), and I will return to some of its 
problems below. But the analogy at least suggests—since we might 
imagine divine concurrence as the help a strong man gives to a weak 
one when carrying a heavy weight—that created causes alone are too 
weak to bring about their effects, and therefore require divine help. 
      This is in fact the claim that Ockham argues for, in opposition to 
some of his contemporaries (most notably Peter John Olivi and Peter 
Auriol14). More precisely, he thinks that we can demonstrate that cre-
ated natural agents cannot be total causes of their effects:  
 
A total natural principle, equally directed towards many things of 
the same kind, either produces all or nothing; but if a creature can 
create some individual, then by the same reason by which that one 
<was created, it can create> infinitely many. Because it is a natural 
agent, it is directed towards everything, therefore it can actually 
create infinitely many individuals. This is false, therefore, etc.15 
 
As Ockham argues here, natural agents—contrary to voluntary ones—
are equally directed towards all their effects, possibly infinitely many. 
Thus, if they create a specific thing, that means that a primary cause is 
directing them to it—in which case the natural agent is not in fact a 
total but only a partial cause of that effect. Since natural agents do not 
(and cannot) bring about infinitely many things, it means that they are 
not total causes of their effects.  
      The argument in itself is perhaps less than fully convincing, but 
Ockham continues to elaborate on the theory. He thinks that we can 
also show that God is a primary cause with the primacy of perfection 
and unconstrainedness, but not with the primacy of duration.  
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aliquis debilis portet illa decem cum illo forti, nihilominus ille fortis dicetur imme-
diate portare sicut debilis. Nec propter hoc superfluit ille debilis si fortis non vult 
per se portare decem (OTh V, 72). 
       14. For Olivi, see In Sent. II, q. 116. Petrus Iohannis Olivi, Quaestiones in 
Secundum Librum Sententiarum, ed. Bernardus Jansen (Quaracchi: Ad Claras 
Aquas, 1926), 333–347. For Auriol, see In Sent. II, d. 38, q. 1. Peter Auriol, Com-
mentariorum [sic] in secundum librum Sententiarum (Rome: Zannetti, 1605), 
which text, however, is notoriously unreliable. Cf. also Florence, Conv. Soppr. 
A.3.120. 
       15. Rep. II, q. 6: Principium totale naturale aequaliter se habens ad plura 
eiusdem rationis vel producit omnia vel nihil; sed si creatura potest creare aliquod 
individuum eiusdem rationis, qua ratione unum et infinita. Quia ex quo est agens 
naturale, aequaliter respicit omnia, potest igitur creare de facto infinita individua. 
Hoc est falsum, igitur etc (OTh V, 91). 
      For these different senses of “primacy,” consider, first, that when 
both the sun and a fire produce heat, the sun is primary to the fire with 
the primacy of perfection, since it has more of a power to bring about 
the heat than the fire does. Second, we say that a cause c1 is prior to c2 
with the primacy of unconstrainedness if c1 can produce more diverse 
effects than c2; the sun again is primary to an angel in this sense since 
it can concur with many diverse effects while an angel cannot. Finally, 
primacy of duration can also be taken in two ways: c1 is primary in the 
first sense to c2 just in case it is prior to it according to nature; c1 is pri-
mary to c2 in the second sense just in case c1’s causation precedes that 
of c2 in time.
16 
      According to Ockham, it follows from God’s omnipotence that 
whenever he concurs he is the primary cause both in perfection and 
in unconstrainedness,17 since he has infinite power and can create 
whatever does not involve a logical contradiction—which is not true 
of any other cause. Moreover, as Ockham argues, God is primary to 
secondary causes with the primacy of duration in the first sense but 
not in the second sense; he precedes everything in the sense of natural 
priority, but at the same time when God acts to bring about the sec-
ondary effect, the secondary cause also acts and thus there is no tem-
poral priority.18 
      So far we have established that secondary causes need a primary, 
directing cause, and that God is a primary cause in two senses of pri-
macy (primacy of perfection and primacy of unconstrainedness). But 
one may say that a crucial aspect of any theory of divine concurrence 
is the way it spells out the immediacy of God’s action. Does God act 
merely mediately through the secondary causes, or also immediately? 
And if so, in what sense?  
      Ockham’s answer is “yes,” and for the claim that God is an imme-
diate cause with the immediacy of power, he proposes several argu-
ments. First, it follows already from definition EC. If God exists, and 
by his power keeps agents and created powers in existence, they bring 
about their effect; if, per impossibile, God did not exist, the secondary 
effect would not exist either (of course, nor would the secondary 
cause, for that matter). This means that God’s power of maintaining 
things in existence is immediately joined to every secondary effect (as 
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       16. Rep. I, d. 45, q. un. 
       17. Although in the divine case these two kinds of primacy are grounded on 
the same (the divine omnipotence), they do not necessarily overlap in other cases, 
as the angel example shows. 
       18. Rep. I, d. 45, q. un. 
well as to every secondary cause), and thus God is their immediate 
cause by the immediacy of power.19 
      Furthermore, if God were not an immediate cause, he must be a 
mediate cause; more precisely, a mediate partial cause of effect e. But 
if c1 and c2 are partial causes of e, nevertheless e does not need c2’s 
power to come about, then it seems that c2 is not in fact a partial cause 
of e, after all. Which means that if God is not an immediate cause of 
effects, then he is not their cause at all.20  
      Moreover, every effect depends more on an unconstrained univer-
sal cause than on a constrained one. We experience, however, that 
there is no effect without at least a constrained universal cause being 
present and causing it—we experience, for instance, that no matter 
how proximate a cause is to its recipient, it does not act unless 
amended by the power of the sun (this is most obvious in the case of 
living things).21 Since God is the most unconstrained and most univer-
sal cause, everything must depend on him the most. 
      Finally, Ockham utilizes one of the usual arguments for God’s 
immediate concurrence that thinkers before him also often employed, 
based on the example of Nebuchadnezzar’s fire and contra naturam 
miracles in general. According to this argument, if God does not 
concur with secondary causes, we cannot satisfactorily explain cases 
where an agent is exercising its power, there is no impediment, and 
nevertheless the effect fails to be produced. (Shadrach, Meshach, and 
Abednego were not burned by the fire even though the fire was exer-
cising its causal powers in otherwise favorable circumstances.22) Since 
it seems that miracles like the above are at least logically possible, while 
they would be ruled out by mere conservationism, it follows that mere 
conservationism is false.23  
      From these arguments, Ockham concludes that God immediately 
produces every secondary effect by the immediacy of power—that is, 
in the way in which the king immediately acts when his bailiff acts on 
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       19. Rep. II, q. 3–4 (OTh V, 63). 
       20. Rep. II, q. 3–4. 
       21. Cf. Auct. Arist. 2, 65: homo generat hominem et sol. Jacqueline 
Hamesse, ed., Les auctoritates Aristotelis: Un florilège médiéval (Louvain: Publica-
tions Universitaires, 1974), 145. 
       22. See Daniel 3:19–27. 
       23. The same argument is used by Peter of Palude, arguing against Durand 
of St.-Pourçain’s mere conservationism (In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 4. Zita V. Toth, “Peter 
of Palude on Divine Concurrence: An Edition of his In II Sent., d. 1, q. 4,” 
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 83 (2016): 49–92, 83). And the 
example is similarly used by Hervaeus Natalis and others as well. 
his behalf, or in the way a fire heats up some water in a kettle. To be 
sure, Ockham is quick to point out that God is very much unlike the 
fire in some respects. For instance, while we experience in the physical 
world that whatever produces an effect, itself changes, this is not true 
of God. God’s activity, in this respect, is more similar to how the 
human will causes (forms) a volition. It might happen, for instance, 
that one forms a volition today to write tomorrow, and one preserves 
that volition until tomorrow comes. If one does indeed write tomor-
row, then a partial cause of that writing is one’s volition that will not 
have changed since today. Similarly, Ockham thinks, God can will 
something with unchanging will from eternity, which nevertheless 
comes about only at a certain time.24 
      Although as was said above, Ockham does not explicitly make the 
distinction between the two kinds of immediacy, at other places he 
points out that God may bring about effects immediately with the 
immediacy of supposit as well: 
 
An accident does not depend more on an accident than an acci-
dent depends on a substance. But God can bring about an acci-
dent as an effect without the mediation of a substance. Therefore, 
God can produce any accident as an effect without any other acci-
dent, and so with regard to all other things.25 
 
The structure of this argument is clear: since an accident depends more 
on a substance for its being than on another accident, and since God 
can bring about an accident without the mediation of a substance (as 
for instance in the Eucharist), therefore, God can bring about both 
accidents and substances without the mediation of anything. We 
should note, however, that the argument only demonstrates that God 
can be an immediate cause with the immediacy of supposit, and not 
that God is indeed such an immediate cause for every secondary effect.  
      Having established that God acts immediately in the production 
of secondary effects, as a further characterization of divine concur-
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       24. Rep. II, q. 3–4: Potest enim aliquis nunc velle cras ista hora producere 
aliquem effectum et semper in tali volutnate perseverare, et cras talem effectum 
producere per velle istud continuatum per unum diem. Istud autem velle est causa 
partialis illius effectus extra producti. Et patet quod quando ille effectus producitur, 
voluntas de novo non mutatur (OTh V, 59–60). 
       25. Rep. II, q. 3–4: Non magis dependet accidens ab accidente, quam acci-
dens a substantia. Sed Deus potest facere accidens sine substantia media in ratione 
effectus. Igitur potest facere quodcumque accidens sine alio in ratione effectus, et 
sic est de omnibus aliis (OTh V, 66). 
rence, Ockham also notes that God is a cause of secondary effects by 
both his will and his essence. His position here is directed against 
Scotus, who argued that it is only God’s will that is causally related to 
creatures; otherwise there would be no way to preserve contingency in 
the created world (since God’s essence would be a natural, non-con-
tingent cause).26 As Ockham notes, however, this cannot be main-
tained since there is no real distinction between God’s essence and his 
will due to divine simplicity, and hence if an effect is causally related to 
one it must also be similarly related to the other. According to 
Ockham, just as a will can produce something necessarily (for instance, 
God’s will necessarily produces the Holy Spirit, or an angelic will nec-
essarily produces an intuitive cognition of that will in another angel), 
an essence can also produce something contingently—and this is the 
way, according to Ockham, in which God’s essence produces the sec-
ondary effects.27 
      Overall, so far, Ockham has argued for the following claims: there 
must be some primary cause helping out the secondary causes in the 
production of their effects; and God brings about things both by his 
essence and his will, in an immediate action at least in the sense of 
immediacy of power, but possibly with the immediacy of supposit as 
well. At this point, however, the mere conservationist may onject. For 
let’s consider God’s action and the action of the secondary cause in 
producing an effect. Are these actions, the mere conservationist would 
ask, numerically the same, or numerically different? They cannot be 
the same, since they come from different agents. But if they are differ-
ent, then it seems that the (metaphysically) posterior one is not needed 
for the production of the effect, after all.28  
      Ockham seems to be targeting this or a similar argument when he 
shows that God acts with an action that is both numerically distinct 
from and identical with that of the secondary agent, in different 
respects, and thus the original dilemma is based on a false dichotomy. 
To understand this response we need to keep in mind that, as was 
mentioned earlier, action, for Ockham, is not a distinct Aristotelian 
category but can be fully captured by its relata. Thus, an action, 
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       26. For Scotus’s position, see Ordinatio I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 79–88. 
Johannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio: Liber primus, distinctio prima et secunda, ed. 
Commissio Scotistica, Vol. 2. (Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950). 
       27. Rep. I, d. 45, q. un. 
       28. Durand of St.-Pourçain makes this argument in In Sent. II, d. 1, q. 4. 
Durand of St.-Pourcain, Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarum: distinctiones 1-5 
libri secondi, ed. Fiorella Retucci (Leuven: Peeters, 2012), 53–55.  
Ockham notes, can be taken in three ways. First, it can be taken pro 
respectu, which means that one considers the basis of the relation, 
which in this case is the agent. Since God’s action and the action of the 
secondary agent have different bases, they are different actions in this 
sense. Second, we can also consider actions pro conceptu connotante, 
meaning that the action stands for the agent while connoting the 
effect. Again, in this case actions must be different if their agents are 
different, and thus God’s and the secondary agent’s actions will be dif-
ferent in this sense as well. Finally, we might consider actions to be 
taken pro effectu, that is, for their effect; in this respect, since the ter-
minus of God’s and the secondary agent’s actions is the same, they can 
be considered the same action.29 
      All in all, from these texts it seems clear that Ockham adheres to 
(some version of) the common medieval theory of divine concurrence. 
He thinks that in an instance of causal happening, for instance when 
fire heats up some water, both God and the fire are causally active. 
They are both immediate causes of the heat, and act with actions that 
are in some way numerically identical and in some way numerically dis-
tinct from one another. 
 
TEXTUAL OBJECTIONS 
 
If this were all that Ockham had said about causation and divine concur-
rence, it would be difficult to explain how Gilson could remark that 
“Hume’s philosophy could have dwelt with Ockham’s theology without 
doing it much harm,”30 a point that was repeatedly insisted on by several 
others.31 While, as I intend to show, Ockham was not an occasionalist, 
there seem to be some texts that point in the opposite direction. Thus, 
although it seems clear from the above that Ockham thinks that both 
God and secondary agents are causally active in the happenings of the 
world, consider, for instance, this passage from the Reportatio: 
 
From this it follows that it cannot be demonstrated that any effect 
is produced by a secondary cause: because although when the fire 
approaches the flammable thing, combustion always follows, nev-
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       29. See Rep. II, q. 3–4 (ed. Gedeon Gál, OTh V (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. 
Bonaventure University, 1981), 50–79), esp. 74–75. 
       30. Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1999), 68. 
       31. A florilegium of these Humean and sometimes purely occasionalist inter-
pretations is given in Adams, “Was Ockham a Humean about Efficient Causality?,” 
5–8. 
ertheless it could still be the case that the fire is not its cause. For 
God could have ordained that whenever fire is present to a 
patient close by, the sun would cause combustion <in that 
patient> just as He ordained with the church that when certain 
words are spoken, grace is produced in the soul.32 
 
According to this argument, since it could be the case that fire be 
always followed by heat and nevertheless the former not be a proper 
efficient cause of the latter, it cannot be demonstrated that fire is a 
proper efficient cause of heat. Ockham’s analogy is illuminating: if one 
were to demonstrate, based on constant correlation of c and e that c is 
a proper efficient cause of e, then by the same means one could 
demonstrate that sacraments are proper efficient causes of divine grace. 
Ockham thinks, however, that this would be absurd since sacraments 
are not proper efficient causes of grace but mere visible signs of it 
(more about this below).33 
      In this and several other similar arguments, Ockham curiously 
assumes that the only way we could recognize the causal relation is by 
correlation. Although he does not argue separately for this claim, he 
refers to it as at least plausible: 
 
That this <i.e., definition EC above> suffices for something to be 
the cause of another, is manifest. For if not, then every way of 
knowing something to be an immediate cause of another would 
perish. For if from the fact that if this is posited the effect follows 
and not posited the effect does not follow, it does not follow that 
this is a cause of that effect, there is no way to know that fire is 
the cause of heat in the wood.34 
 
That is, according to Ockham, correlation seems to be our only cogni-
tive access to causal relations, and thus if correlation is not sufficient for 
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       32. Rep. II, q. 3–4: Et ex hoc sequitur quod non potest demonstrari quod 
aliquis effectus producitur a causa secunda: quia licet semper ad approximationem 
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       33. For Ockham’s treatment of sacramental causation, see Rep. IV, q. 1. 
       34. Rep. I, d. 45, q. un.: Quod autem illud sufficiat ad hoc quod aliquid sit 
causa alterius, videtur esse manifestum. Quia si non, perit omnis via ad cognoscen-
dum aliquid esse causam alterius immediatam. Nam si ex hoc quod hoc posito 
sequitur effectus, et hoc non posito non ponitur effectus, non sequitur illud esse 
causam illius effectus, nullo modo potest cognosci quod ignis sit causa caloris in 
ligno (OTh IV, 665). 
causation, then we can never have knowledge about such claims as “fire 
causes burning” or “the doctor heals the patient.” It very well might be 
the case that it is not the fire or the doctor but God who is acting so. 
      It is worth noting also that Ockham’s contemporary, Walter Chat-
ton, recognized already that Ockham cannot consistently claim that 
we could be certain that things act. Consider, for instance, this objec-
tion, directed against Ockham’s reductivism about relations in general: 
 
The first example is this proposition: “Socrates generated Plato.” 
It is either required for the truth of this proposition that there 
existed a relation <between them>, or not. But against this 
<latter>: it could be both true that every absolute thing existed 
and nevertheless Socrates did not generate Plato.35 
 
Although Chatton’s target is more general, the objection applies to 
causation as well. As he points out, if one holds—as Ockham does—
that there are no relations apart from absolute things (their founda-
tions), then we could never know that Socrates generated Plato, for 
the simple reason that both it and its denial are compossible with the 
existence of Socrates and Plato as absolute things.36 
      Beside these remarks, it may seem that an occasionalist interpreta-
tion would seem to fit well with Ockham’s insistence on the claim that 
God’s omnipotence implies that God can produce immediately what-
ever a secondary cause can produce; that is, for any particular second-
ary effect, God could bring about that it was produced not by its sec-
ondary cause but by God himself.37 And since we might not know 
whether God does produce an effect at a given time or perhaps even 
constantly, we might just as well be living in a world where secondary 
causes do not genuinely act. These considerations seem to suggest that 
Ockham, contrary to the above presentation, is actually an occasional-
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potest per se immediate (OTh I, 35). 
ist, or at least that—whether or not he is aware of it—is committed to 
occasionalism.  
      One might also wonder, on the other hand, whether Ockham 
really thinks that divine concurrence is necessary. Recall the “strong 
man” analogy quoted above. As the analogy describes, we might imag-
ine divine concurrence as the help a strong man gives to a weak one 
when carrying a heavy weight. This seems to imply that although the 
power of the created agent is incapable of bringing about its intended 
effect without God augmenting that power, Ockham thinks that the 
secondary cause is at least sufficient to bring its power into action. 
While this action may not be strong enough to produce the intended 
effect, it brings about its own part entirely on its own. With this, 
Ockham seems to disagree with some earlier thinkers who thought 
that divine concurrence was needed for the secondary agent to act at 
all,38 which may suggest that contrary to being an occasionalist, 
Ockham is actually a mere conservationist. 
      Second, Ockham also thinks that we cannot demonstrate that God 
is a free creator, because we cannot demonstrate that God creates more 
than one thing at all.39 But if this is so, then it seems that we also 
cannot know that God concurs with more than one thing, and conse-
quently, that he concurs with every secondary cause. Thus, we may 
have no good reason to suppose that he does so. 
       
TRUTH AND DEMONSTRABILITY 
 
      I will proceed with the textual objections backwards, although the 
strategy of answering them will be similar. In short, while Ockham 
thinks that both mere conservationism and occasionalism are false, he 
does not think that they are demonstrably so. 
      Ockham does not think that the falsity of mere conservationism 
can be demonstrated, since—as the textual objection points out—he 
does not think that we can demonstrate that God produces multiple 
things. The latter demonstration would imply that we can demonstrate 
that God is a free agent, and according to Ockham, no such demon-
stration can be given. Although the topic of divine freedom might 
seem somewhat tangential to the issue of divine concurrence, it is the 
hook on which many of Ockham’s claims about divine concurrence 
hang, and so worth looking at it more closely. 
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       38. See, e.g., Aquinas, Quaestiones de potential Dei, q. 3, a. 7. 
       39. See below; Rep. II, q. 5. 
      Ockham’s—rather unsurprising—main thesis in this part of the 
Reportatio40 is that God brings about everything freely. Nevertheless, 
he develops this thesis together with a rejection of Aquinas’s and 
Scotus’s arguments for the same, and together with the rejection of 
another argument proposal that he deems as the best one. Conse-
quently, he concludes that we actually cannot demonstrate that God 
creates freely.41 
      Aquinas’s main tenet when considering God’s freedom was to 
refute the position according to which creation happened by necessity, 
as some Neoplatonists (and arguably Avicenna) maintained. Aquinas 
does this by distinguishing acts by will and acts by necessity and con-
sidering the question whether God acts by the former or by the latter. 
Thus, for instance, in the Summa theologiae he claims that “it must be 
said that God’s will is the cause of things, and that God acts by will 
and not by the necessity of nature, as some supposed.”42 Ockham 
claims, however, that Aquinas’s argument cannot establish the conclu-
sion (namely, that God acts freely), since acting by will does not nec-
essarily imply acting freely. As he notes, citing Aquinas, “the divine will 
and ours will God naturally, and thus when something is judged by the 
intellect, the will necessarily wills it.”43 Which means, as Ockham 
points out, that Aquinas is committed to the thesis that the will can be 
necessitated by the intellect, and thus the argument according to 
which God acts by will therefore freely, is not sound. 
      Neither does Scotus’s solution work, according to Ockham. 
Scotus thinks that the divine will is contingently related to its effects, 
grounding thereby all contingency in the created world; if there were 
no contingency in the divine will, there could be no contingency in 
creatures either (since they do not act except by virtue of the first 
cause), which we know to be false.44 As Ockham notes, however, 
“from the contingency of the secondary cause one cannot argue for 
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       44. Cf. Ord. I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 79–88. 
the contingency in the first cause.”45 For we might have concurring 
causes of a contingent effect, in such a way that one of these concur-
ring causes is not free: for instance, when the will and an object concur 
as partial causes to form an act of volition, the former is a contingent 
cause of that volition while the latter is a natural, non-contingent cause 
of it. Thus, it is at least possible that in a contingent secondary effect, 
whose partial causes are the secondary cause and God, the former is a 
contingent cause while the latter is not. 
      Ockham thinks that these earlier arguments are mistaken because 
it cannot be demonstrated, strictly speaking, that God is a free cause 
of everything even though it should be believed. Take, for instance, an 
argument that Ockham deems more persuasive than any of the previ-
ously presented ones: 
 
Every non-impedible cause, equally directed towards many or 
infinitely many things, if at a certain time it brings about one of 
these things but not another, is a contingent and free cause. 
Because from the fact that it is not impedible and is and is equally 
and equally primarily directed towards all those things, there 
seems to be no reason why it produces one rather than another 
unless because of its freedom. But God is such a cause with 
respect to everything that is producible by him from eternity, 
therefore etc.46 
 
Thus, according to this proposed argument, since God is omnipotent 
and thus equally directed towards all producible things (i.e., all things 
that are logically compossible), the fact that he only created some of 
them could not be explained except by his free will. 
      While Ockham thinks that this argument fares better than the pre-
vious ones, he does not think that it is, strictly speaking, demonstra-
tive. As he notes later, 
 
This argument is not a demonstration to an infidel, because he 
would say that God is not immediately and equally directed 
towards all producible things, but produces the first intelligence 
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       45. Rep. II, q. 3–4: Ex contingentia causae secundae non potest argui con-
tingentia in prima (OTh V, 55). 
       46. Rep. II, q. 3–4: Omnis causa non impedibilis aequaliter respiciens multa 
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primo, non videtur ratio quare plus producit unum quam aliud nisi propter liber-
tatem suam. Sed Deus est huiusmodi causa respectu omnium producibilium ab eo 
ab aeterno, igitur etc. (OTh V, 55–56). 
by necessity, and by the mediation of the first produces the other 
or that first intelligence produces the other, and so forth. There-
fore, if it could be shown by natural reason that God produces de 
novo when he produces one and not another, it would follow that 
we could show contingency in God.47 
 
Thus, the reason why Ockham thinks divine freedom is indemonstra-
ble, is because we cannot philosophically demonstrate that multiple 
diverse things in the world were created by God. One might maintain, 
with Avicenna, that the only thing that God produces is the first intel-
ligence, and either God produces the second intelligence by the medi-
ation of the first intelligence, or the first intelligence itself produces the 
second intelligence, and so on. In this case, however, God would, by 
himself, produce only one effect—and he would not be free in the rel-
evant sense.  
      Returning to the question of concurrence, it might be the case 
that similarly to creation, God only concurs with the first intelligence, 
while that concurs with the second and so on. Recall that when earlier 
Ockham demonstrated that secondary causes cannot be total causes of 
their effects, he did not specify what the concurring cause was—just 
that there was one. Thus, it is not demonstrably false that God does 
not concur with secondary causes at all to produce their effects. 
      We should note, however, that in all of these texts, Ockham’s 
main concern is demonstrability. It is not demonstrably true that God 
is a free agent; nevertheless, Ockham thinks we have good reasons to 
believe so. And, as was seen above, with that much, we can know—and 
even demonstrate—that secondary causes require God’s concurrence, 
that that concurrence is immediate, and in different respects is both 
numerically identical to and different from the action of the secondary 
agent. All these claims followed from the assumption that God is a free 
agent who brings about multiple things in the universe, which is an 
assumption, Ockham thinks, that all his opponents would accept. 
      Let us return to Ockham’s analogy. The “strong man” objection 
is an objection only insofar as a theory of concurrence would require 
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Young University Press, 2005). 
more than what the analogy suggests. That, however, seems to be an 
unreasonable assumption. It is true that some concurrentists—most 
notably Aquinas—maintain that secondary agents cannot even exercise 
their powers without divine help. As I pointed out in the introduction, 
however, theories of concurrence occupy a whole spectrum, and this is 
also true of concurrentists’ theories in particular: they need not agree 
on every detail. Ockham’s theory, which maintains that God’s help is 
only needed to strengthen the secondary agent’s power, is more simi-
lar to Scotus’s view, who had argued against Aquinas’s instrumental 
causal model of concurrence.48 
      It seems that Ockham’s strategy in answering the charge of occa-
sionalism would be similar. In short, he thinks that the above given def-
inition EC is not a good definition of real efficient causality. It is not a 
good definition, since both genuine efficient causes and mere sine qua 
non causes fulfill it, while we can draw a (non-trivial) distinction 
between these two even if we may not be able to demonstrate which of 
them we see in a particular instance of causation. Since EC would be a 
sufficient characterization if causation were understood in occasionalist 
terms, this shows that Ockham’s understanding is more than that.  
      Ockham’s stance on the distinction between proper and sine qua 
non causes can be best seen in his discussion of sacramental causation. 
The main question—involving various theological and metaphysical dif-
ficulties that we will need to disregard here—was whether and how 
sacraments cause their effects in the recipient (that is, how they cause 
grace in the soul), and whether there is any difference between this cau-
sation and regular causation in nature. Most thinkers wanted to maintain 
that sacraments are somehow causally related to the grace that follows 
them; sacraments “effect what they figure.”49 Nevertheless, most 
thinkers also wanted to maintain that sacraments cannot be proper 
causes of grace, since that would give rise to serious metaphysical as well 
as theological worries if not straight-out absurdities (e.g., a corporeal 
thing bringing about an incorporeal effect that surpasses its actuality).50 
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(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 47–76; and eadem, Some 
Ockham, in particular, and in contrast to Aquinas,51 thought that sacra-
ments cannot be proper causes but are mere sine qua non causes of grace. 
      After presenting his view that sacraments are not proper causes, 
even though to their presence the presence of grace follows, Ockham 
raises and answers an objection. The objection, as formulated in the 
Reportatio, runs thus: 
 
It seems that everything such that when it is posited another is 
posited, is a cause properly speaking; for it does not pertain to the 
notion of cause that the effect follows necessarily, but that the effect 
cannot exist without it. Therefore, it is enough that, when it is 
posited, the effect is posited and that the effect is not posited with-
out it. Therefore, the sacraments are causes properly speaking.52 
 
The objection is a common one, and will be similarly dealt with by later 
thinkers as well, including Peter of Ailly and Gabriel Biel53: since, accord-
ing to definition EC, correlation is sufficient for causation, and since cor-
relation can be found in the sacraments-grace pair (where the sacraments 
are always followed by grace), therefore—contrary to Ockham’s proposed 
and defended view—the sacraments are proper efficient causes of grace. 
      Ockham, denying that sacraments are proper efficient causes of 
grace, responds to the objection by denying that the above formulated 
criterion—the criterion of correlation—indeed gives a sufficient condi-
tion of c being an efficient cause of e. Thus, against the objection he 
notes: “To the first principal objection I say that it is true if it is so by 
the nature of the thing. But when it is so by the will of another, it is 
not true.”54 As this shows, Ockham did not think that the notion of 
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causality is exhausted by the notion of constant correlation, or that it 
is compatible with c being an efficient cause of e that God (and not c) 
produces e. On the contrary, he distinguishes proper efficient causes 
from sine qua non causes, even though both fulfill definition EC.  
      In another place Ockham makes the distinction between proper 
and sine qua non causes even more clearly: 
 
Therefore, to the question I first propose a distinction. . . . 
Because “cause,” if it is that the being of which is followed by 
another, can be taken in two ways. One way, when from the 
nature of the thing the presence and being of one is naturally fol-
lowed by the being of the other. The other way, when the being 
of one is followed by the being of another merely by the will of 
another. And in this way we say that the meritorious act is a cause 
with respect to the reward merely by the divine will. And a sine 
qua non cause is a cause in the second way.55 
 
According to Ockham’s distinction, 
 
EC1: c is a proper efficient cause of e just in case if c is posited 
then e is (or can be) posited without any further entities, by the 
nature of c, while if c is not posited then e cannot be posited by 
the nature of c. 
 
On the other hand, 
 
SN: c is a sine qua non efficient cause of e just in case if c is posited 
then e is posited without any further entities, not by its nature but 
by someone’s will, while if c is not posited then e is not posited 
either by someone’s will. 
 
That is, we talk about a proper efficient cause when c is followed by e 
by the nature of c, in other words, by its own causal powers;56 while we 
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talk about a sine qua non cause when c is followed by e not by the 
nature of c but by the will and power of another. Fire, for instance, is 
a proper efficient cause of heat in this sense, but a stop light is a mere 
sine qua non cause of the stopping of my car. Sacraments are also mere 
sine qua non causes of grace: they are followed by grace even though 
they do not possess sufficient power to effect it in any way. Instead of 
the material sacraments bringing about grace, it is God’s will and 
power that does so every time when the sacraments are present.57 
      As it is clear from this, Ockham does not think that in regular effi-
cient causation it is God who produces the effect, as the occasionalist 
would have it. On the contrary, he thinks that when we see that the 
burning fire is followed by the heat in the wood, it is indeed the fire 
that produces the heat. 
      We should return, however, to the passages quoted above that 
seem to indicate that this is not so, since they point to an important 
feature of Ockham’s account, namely: while Ockham thinks that occa-
sionalism is false, and we have good reasons to suppose so, he does not 
think that its falsity is demonstrable. (The Reportatio passage quoted 
above started with exactly this claim: “It cannot be demonstrated.”) 
Ockham repeatedly insists that we cannot demonstrate that fire pro-
duces heat in the water because we cannot demonstrate that it is not 
something else that is doing so. And we cannot demonstrate the latter, 
since the negation of it does not entail a contradiction. Thus, Ockham 
points out in the same passage, it is at least logically possible that God 
so ordained the world that whenever a flammable thing is near fire, the 
sun produces combustion in it. While Ockham does not consider here 
the more radical scenario according to which it would not be the sun 
but God himself producing combustion, by similar reasoning, it seems 
that Ockham would have to say that there would be no logical contra-
diction in that scenario either. Consequently, occasionalism is not 
demonstrably false. 
      Some of Ockham’s medieval contemporaries would insist that we 
experience causation, and thus we have at least experiential knowledge 
that occasionalism is false. Ockham, however, famously denies this. 
One of his rather interesting examples occur in the Quodlibeta, where 
he considers whether a creature can create, if we take ‘creation’ to be 
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the induction of a new form without a preexisting subject. Ockham’s 
answer is the usual negative one, but in the discussion he raises an 
objection according to which a creature does create, namely when, for 
instance, in the Eucharistic wine it produces an accidental change. 
According to the metaphysics of sacraments presupposed here, in the 
Eucharistic wine there is no subject that would receive change—in 
fact, all the accidents in it are accidents without a substance, because 
the substance of the wine is not present (and the substance that is pres-
ent, namely Christ’s body, is not apt to receive these same accidental 
forms). Thus, when the Eucharistic wine approaches a fire, and the fire 
induces some heat in it, the fire seems to create the heat in the sense 
specified above. And this would be a problem since creation in this 
sense was held to be unique to God alone. 
      Ockham responds to the objection this way: 
 
I reply that I understand the principle in question as follows: 
When the effect is by its nature apt to be caused and apt to exist 
naturally in the presence of the agent, then bringing about some-
thing is nothing else than the effect’s existing in this way. In the 
case under discussion, however, this is not the way it is, since the 
heat in question is not naturally apt to be produced by the fire. 
For the heat exists without a subject, and a natural agent is not 
able to produce anything without a patient. Hence, if God did not 
produce this heat, then nothing would be produced here in the pres-
ence of the fire. For there is no recipient subject here.58 
 
Thus, despite what we expect based on our experience, what happens 
when the Eucharistic wine approaches the fire is not that the fire 
induces some heat in it; indeed, fire can do nothing in this case, since 
there is no subject on which to act, and all natural agents presuppose 
a subject to act on. Instead, as Ockham claims, the new accident in the 
wine is created by God directly. 
      Thus, it seems that Ockham, even if not considering such scenar-
ios explicitly, is committed to the claim that we do not have indu-
bitable experiential knowledge that occasionalism is false. For since we 
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       58. Quodl. II, q. 9: Illud principium intelligo sic: quando effectus natus est 
naturaliter causari et esse ad praesentiam agentis, tunc efficere non est nisi effectum 
sic esse. In proposito autem non est sic, quia ille calor non est natus produci ab 
igne, quia est sine subiecto; et agens naturale non potest aliquid producere sine 
passo. Unde si Deus non produceret illum calorem, nihil produceretur ibi ad prae-
sentiam ignis, ex quo non est ibi subiectum patiens (OTh IX, 156. William 
Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, ed. and trans. Alfred Freddoso (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), 131–132. 
know that instances like qualitative changes in the Eucharistic wine 
actually happen, we cannot exclude the possibility of it always happen-
ing. Imagine someone, with no knowledge of sacramental theology 
and metaphysics, whose only experience of causation is one involving 
the Eucharist. Although she might be justified in concluding from her 
experiences that fire causes heat in the wine, her judgment in this case 
would be wrong. Moreover, since only those propositions are demon-
strable whose negation entail a contradiction, and since—as we have 
just seen—it is not the case with propositions such as “the heat in the 
presence of fire is produced by the fire,” Ockham is committed to the 
claim that we cannot demonstrate that occasionalism is false.59 
      Nevertheless, just as it was the case with respect to mere conserva-
tionism, we should notice that here, again, Ockham’s concern is 
demonstrability. While we cannot demonstrate that secondary causes 
act and that occasionalism is false, based on many experiences and sub-
sequent abstract reasoning, we have very good reasons to believe so. 
       
CONCLUSION 
 
      In summary, like many of his contemporaries, Ockham thinks that 
God freely and immediately concurs with every created agent, and is 
thus a partial cause of every effect. But he also thinks that neither the 
falsity of mere conservationism nor the falsity of occasionalism is philo-
sophically demonstrable. We cannot demonstrate that mere conserva-
tionism is false, since it could be the case that it is only the first effect 
that God produces immediately, and not the generable effects of the 
sublunar world. The demonstrability of the falsity of mere conserva-
tionism would depend on the demonstrability of God being a free 
cause; and since the latter—pace Scotus—is not demonstrable, accord-
ing to Ockham, God’s immediate concurrence with secondary causes 
is not demonstrable either.  
      On the other hand, the falsity of occasionalism is not demonstra-
ble since God in principle could have made the world such that its effi-
cient causes are not those which we think they are; in fact, this happens 
in cases involving qualitative changes in the Eucharist. Can we arrive 
at a logical contradiction by assuming that we live in a sacramental uni-
verse? According to Ockham, we cannot. But do we have good reasons 
to suppose that we do not in fact do so? According to Ockham, we do.  
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       59. It is important to emphasize, however, that—unlike for instance Gabriel 
Biel later—he does not explicitly consider occasionalism in the context of the qual-
itative change in the Eucharistic wine. 
      Should these indemonstrability claims worry us, or at least, should 
they worry Ockham? Is it not unsatisfactory, metaphysically speaking, 
that it is logically possible that we live in an occasionalist universe 
where causation is just like sacramental causation? Should it worry 
especially the theologically minded audience, that God may not be 
causally acting in the universe at all (a view that could lead to problems 
concerning divine foreknowledge and providence)? 
      It seems that whether one should really regard the logical possibil-
ity of a sacramental universe as endangering our everyday notion of 
causation, depends on what standards of certainty one adopts. And as 
far as Ockham is concerned, the answer to the above questions is “no.” 
The indemonstrability of the falsity of occasionalism is only worrisome 
(if one is worried about occasionalism at all) if one thinks, with 
Descartes or Nicholas of Autrecourt, that we can be certain only of 
demonstrable things, that is, if one thinks that we can be certain of 
something only if its negation entails a contradiction. As was just seen, 
according to Ockham, occasionalism is not like that, and thus it fol-
lows that if this is Ockham’s standard of certainty, then he would be 
committed to the claim that we cannot be certain and cannot know 
that occasionalism is false. 
      Ockham, however, together with most of his contemporaries, 
does not think that we need such unqualified certainty in order to have 
knowledge. For instance, according to him, we can have certainty 
regarding judgments about sense experience (from intuitive cognition) 
as well as about such abstract concepts as “substance,” even though 
neither of these is demonstrable strictly speaking: even though, for 
instance, God could even bring it about that we have an intuitive cog-
nition of non-existents,60 and even though we sometimes see a man 
when he is actually not one.61 Nevertheless, according to Ockham, we 
do have sufficient certainty of claims like ‘this is a man,’ even if this cer-
tainty is not infallible. 
      Consequently, Ockham has no skeptical worries arising from the 
indemonstrability of the concurrentist claim either. As we have seen, 
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       60. We need not get into the debate whether or to what extent this is possi-
ble, and what skeptical consequences it may entail. For a summary of this long-
standing debate, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “Intuitive Cognition, Certainty, and 
Scepticism in William Ockham,” Traditio 26 (1970): 389–398. Ockham seems to 
think that if God causes an intuitive knowledge of non-existent, then the intellect 
would judge that it did not exist and thus would not be deceived. 
       61. The standard medieval example for this latter kind of mistake is Tobit and 
the angel in the Book of Tobit, 5. 
he spends great effort demonstrating various details of his concurren-
tist view, as opposed to what the mere conservationist would say, and 
distinguishing regular causation from sine qua non causation, as 
opposed to what an occasionalist would say. The distinction between 
proper and sine qua non causes, so crucial for Ockham, will start to 
diminish in some later thinkers, as a consummation of which Gabriel 
Biel, in a self-proclaimed Ockhamist fashion, can insist that “if God 
determined himself that from this day, to the utterance of some words 
that are uttered by anyone, he would will to give rain, then those 
words just uttered would be the proper causes of rain.”62 But as was 
shown above, Ockham would find this thought very alien.
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       62. Collectorium IV, d. 1, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1, notabile 3: [S]i Deus determinaret 
se, quod ab hac die ad prolationem alicuius verbi a quocumque prolati velit dare 
pluviam, verbum illud iam prolatum proprie esset causa pluviae (Werbeck ed., 14).
